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TilE PROHIBITION AGAINST TAKING ENDANGERED WILDLIFE
IN SECTION 9 OF TIIE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973:
THE EXISTENCE OF EXCEPTIONS SUPPORTS FULL ENFORCEMENT
'

Federico Cheever•
The federal Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543, is our
primary national bulwark against the
destruction of the biological diversity on
which ecosystems depend.
The most
f~r-reaching of the Act's protections is the
prohibition against taking in section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
The prohibition against taking flatly forbids
any entity, public or private, from "taking" any
designated species of endangered wildlife.
"Taking" includes any act that causes death or
injury to any member of an endangered
species, even death or injury that results
indirectly from habitat modification. The
section 9 taking prohibition is a powerful law,
but has never been fully enforced.

In 1982, Congress amended the
Endangered Species Act and added two
exceptions to the taking prohibition, one for
"incidental" takings resulting from federal
actions, in sections 7(b)(4) and 7(o)(2) of the
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4) & (o)(2), and
one for "incidental" takings resulting from all
other actions, in section lO(a) of the Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a). These exceptions are
intended to allow limited takings of
endangered species while preventing injury to
the species as a whole. The capacity of these
exceptions to achieve this goal is still
unproved. However, the existence of the
exceptions offers new reasons ·tO enforce the
section 9 taking prohibition.
A The Section 9 Taking Proh.ibition
The taking prohibition embodied in
section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of

1973 is simple, unambiguous and breathtaking
in its scope.
Endangered Species Act
sections
9(a)(1)(B)&(C),
16
U.S.C.'
§1538(a)(l)(B)&(C), forbid anyone to "take~
any member of any endangered species of fish
or wildlife "within the United States or the
territorial seas of the United States" or "upon
the high seas.'' Section 2(19), 16 U.S.C.
§1531(19), defines "take" as "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect, or· to attempt to engage in any
such conduct." The term take was defined "in
the broadest possible manner to include every
conceivable way in which a person can 'take'
or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." S.
Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
The United States Fish and Wildlife
Service ("USFWS"), which is responsible for
enforcing the Endangered Species Act for
almost all endangered species, has defined
"harass" and "harm" in the definition of "take"
to include indirect injury through habitat
destruction or modification. USFWS defines
"harm" to include an "act" that results in
"significant habitat modification
or
degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavior patterns." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c).
USFWS defines "harass" to include an
"intentional or negligent act or omission" that
creates "the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to
significantly disrupt normal behavioral
patterns." Id.
The broad
USFWS
definitions accurately reflect Congressional
intent. The House committee report on the
1973 Jaw contemplated that the prohibition
against harassment would · allow federal
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agencies "to regulate or prohibit the activities
of birdwatchers where the effect of those
activities might disturb the birds and make it
difficult for them to hatch or raise their
young." H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1973).

1294 (8th Cir. 1989)( holding that EPA's
continuing approval of above-ground use of
pesticides containing strychnine or strychnine
sulfate was a "takint because it indirectly
resulted in the poisoning of "non-target"
endangered species); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694
F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988) on appeal
88-6041 (5th Cir.)(holding that U.S. Forest
Service timber management on national
forests in Texas was a ntaking" of the
endangered Red-Cockaded Woodpecker·
because it degraded and fragmented
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker habitat). See
also National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 23
E.R.C. 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

The provisions of the section 9 taking
prohibition can be enforced either by federal
government action or by citizen suit. See 16
U.S.C. § 1540(e) & (g).
The statute
encourages citizen suits with a generous fee
shifting provision. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4).
The federal government may bring criminal
prosecutions for "knowing" violations of the
prohibition. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1). The
section 9 taking prohibition makes it a
violation of federal law for anyone to harm or
injure or attempt to harm or injure any
member of any endangered animal species
anywhere in the United States, on public land
or private land, or on the high seas. For
these reasons, section 9 is, perhaps, the most
powerful piece of wildlife legislation in the
world.

B. Enforcement of the Section 9 Taking
Prohibition
Section 9 of the Endangered Species
Act is a statutory provision with teeth, a law
intended to be a powerful tool in a national
effort to preserve the biological diversity on
which ecosystems, and therefore all of us,
depend. Unfortunately, section 9 has never
been fully enforced. Despite the handful of
cases demonstrating its power, an apparently
general reluctance to invoke the far-reaching
language of section 9 taking prohibition has
relegated it to a subsidiary role in
Endangered Species Act litigation, a satellite
to the more limited substantive provisions of
Endangered Species Act section 7.

Recent cases demonstrate the power
and versatility of the section 9 taking
See, ~ Palila v. Hawaii
prohibition.
Department of Land and Natural Resources,
471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979) aff'd 639
F.2d .495 (9th Cir. 1981 )(holding that
defendants had "taken" the endangered Palila
bird in violation of section 9 by maintaining
feral sheep and goats that ·degraded the
mamane-niao forest on which the Pali!a
depends and ordering the removal of the
feral sheep and goats from Palila habitat);
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and
Natural Resources, (Palila TI), 649 F. Supp.
1070 (D.. Hawaii 1986) aff'd 852 F.2d 1106
(9th Cir. 1988)( holding that defendants had
"taken" the Palila by maintaining a population
of mouflon sheep in the mamane-niao forest);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator.
Environmental Protection Agency, 688 F .
. Supp. 1334 (D. MiJ1n. 1?88) aff'd 882 F.2d

A striking example of a failure to
enforce section 9 appears in the Fifth
Circuit's recent consideration of the adequacy
of regulations to limit takings of sea turtles
caused by shrimping. In State of Louisiana
ex ref Guste v. Veritv, 853 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1988), the court upheld the challenged
regulations while· ignoring
the legal
ramifications of the fact that sea turtles are
being taken.
The court considered the
evidence of how many turtles are being killed
in shrimp nets. The court observed that "the
relationship of shrimping to sea turtle

' .
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mortality is strongly demonstrated" and
that 2,381
threatened or
estimated
. endangered turtles are killed by shrimpers
each year off Louisiana alone. But the court
failed to consider whether this mass killing
violated the section 9 taking prohibition.

enforcement.
First, sections 7(b)(4) and 7(o)(2)
together authorize USFWS and NMFS to
include "incidental take statements" as part of
biological opinions rendered for federal
agencies through the Endangered Species Act
section 7 consultation process. Section 7
consultation is intended to insure that actions
authorized, funded or carried out by federal ·
agencies will not jeopardize the continued
existence of any threatened or endangered
species. These "statements" allow a federal
agency or an applicant for federal
authorization or funding, planning to engage
in an action that is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of a species, to take
members o[ that species if the taking is not
the purpose of the action.

The unwillingness to enforce the
section 9 taking prohibition fully has distorted
the law of endangered species, creating a
system of unequal justice in which some
groups and individuals are taken to court for
acts that would go unquestioned if committed
by others. The State of Hawaii is ordered to
remove feral sheep and goats from the
habitat of the endangered Palila, while the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has difficulty
enforcing any habitat protections for the
endangered 'Aiala, or Hawaiian crow, on
private land.
The United States Forest
Service is forced to preserve adequate habitat
for
the
endangered
Red-Cockaded
Woodpecker, while private timber companies
have been free to log in woodpecker habitat.
This distortion of the law limits the
protection available to endangered species
and creates the impression that the law is
unfair. If left uncorrected, it could erode our
national commitment to preserving biological
diversity and biological diversity_itself. ·

Second, section 10(a) allows USFWS
or NMFS to issue "incidental take permits"
for non-federal actions that might otherwise
violate the section 9 taking prohibition, if the
incidental taking "will not appreciably reduce
the likelihood of the survival and recovery of
the species in the wild." These exceptions to
the taking prohibitjon were provided under
explicitly limited conditions designed to
prevent harm to the species as a whole.
Without amending section 9 itself, the
1982 amendments transformed the taking
prohibition from an inflexible rule against
almost all takings into instrument which can
be used to force entities, public or private,
whose activities might harm endangered
specjes, into the section 7 or section 10
administrative process, processes designed to
resolve conflicts between species preservation
and development or other potentially harmful
activities. Eight years a_fter their enactment,
the effect of these ·exceptions is only
beginning to be felt.

C. Exceptions to the Taking Prohibition
The general reluctance to enforce the
section 9 taking prohibition has grown, in
large part, out of a perception that the
prohibition was draconian, that it lacked the
flexibility necessary to avoid injustice in
specific cases.
However, the 1982
amendments to sections 7(b)(4), 7(o)(2) and
lO(a) of the Endangered Species Act have
given USFWS and the National Marine
Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), the agencies that
administer the Act, discretion to fashion
exceptions to the ~aking prohibition to
prevent injustice that might b~ caused by full
3

1. 7(b)4)/7(o)C2)
"Statements"

Incidental

"reasonably" and "prudently" to protect the
species is done.
The explicit conditions
required for a valid incidental take statement
make it plain that Congress did not intend to
simply exempt federal agencies from section
9's requirements.

Take

Section 7(b)(4) of the Endangered
Species Act provides that if, after consultation
on a federal action under section 7, USFWS
or NMFS concludes: (A) that the action
subject to consultation will not jeopardize the
species or recommends a "reasonable and
prudent alternative" that will prevent
jeopardy, and (B) that the taking "incidental"
to the action is not likely to jeopardize the
species, then USFWS or NMFS "shall"
provide the federal agenc.,"Y with a "written
statement" that:
(i) specifies the impact of the incidental
taking on the species;
(ii) specifies the "reasonable and prudent
measures" that USFWS or NMFS considers
"necessary and appropriate" to minimize that
impact,
(iii) in the case of marine mammals, specifies
those me.asures that are necessary to comply
with the Marine Ma'mmal Protection Act, and
(iv) sets forth "the terms and conditions ...
that must be complied with by the Federal
agency or applicant (if any) or both, to
implement the measures specified under
clauses (ii) and (iii)."

The section 7(b)(4)n(o)(2) exception
·offers federal agencies a mechanism through
which they can shield themselves from the
section 9 taking prohibition in most cases.
·Whenever either USFWS or NMFS issues a
"no jeopardy" biological opinion under section
7 of the Endangered Species Act, and that
agency anticipates incidental taking as a result
of the contemplated action, the agency should
also issue an incidental take statement. See
Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA 882 F.2d 1294,
1301 (8th Cir. 1989)(holding that a
"statement" cannot operate retroactively),
National Wildlife Federation v, National Park
Service, 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo.
1987)(holding that "statement" is not required
when no taking is anticipated); National
Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 23 E.R.C. 1089
(E.D. Cal. 1985)( holding that a "statement"
must contain reasonable and prudent
mitigation measures and cannot operate
retroactively); see also American Littoral
Societv v. Herndon, 720 F. Supp. 942, 948-49
(S.D. Fla. 1988).

Section
7(o)(2)
provides,
"[n]otwithstanding" section 9, that ''any taking"
that complies with the "terms and conditions"
of an incidental take statement provided
under "subsection [7](b)(4)(iv) ... shall not
be considered to be a prohibited taking of
the species concerned."

2. Section lO(a) Incidental Take
"Permits"
Section 10(a) provides that "the Secretary
[NMFS or USFWS] may permit under such
terms and .conditions as he shall prescribe ..
. any laking otherwise prohibited by section
1538(a)(l)(B) (the section 9 provision
prohibiting takings within the United States
and its territorial waters] ... if the taking is
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity."
Section lO(a) allows non-federal entities, not
subject to section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act and therefore not eligible for a

Although sections 7(b)(4) and
7(o)(2) together allow actions authorized,
funded or carried out by a federal agency to
go forward even when they will kill or injure
members of an endangered species, sections
7(b)( 4) and 7(o)(2) are intended to ensure
that the taking they authorize will not
jeopardize the continued existence of the
species and that everything that can be ctQne
4

7(b)(4)/7(o )(2) exception, to get permits for
"incidental takings."
While many of its
requirements are very similar to those of the
7(b)(4)/7(o)(2) exception, its provisions are
more detailed, more time consuming, and
potentially more stringent.

subparagraph (A)(iv) [measures the Secretary
finds necessary or appropriate] will be met.
The permitting agency may also require
"assurances" that the plan will be
implemented and may impose ~reporting
requirements" in the permit. The agency
"shall" revoke the permit if the permittee is
not complying with its "terms or conditions." ·

To get a section lO(a) incidental
take permit an "applicant" must submit a
"conservation plan" to the agency charged
with protecting the species, USFWS or
NMFS. The required "conservation plan"
must specify:

The legislative history of section lO(a)
shows that tbe broad statutory language
authorizing USFWS or NMFS to impose
permit conditions as it deems "necessary or
appropriate" was part of an attempt to
prompt both agencies and permit applicants
to widen their horiwns: to consider
protecting unlisted species and ecosystems as
a whole as well as listed endangered species.
The explicitly contemplated quid pro quo for
taking the broad view in conservation
planning was "long-term assurances to the
proponent of the conservation plan that the
terms of the plan will be adhered to and that
further mitigation requirements will only be
imposed in accordance with the terms of the
plan." See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835, 97th
Cong. 2d Sess. 30-31 (1982). The comments
accompanying publication of the proposed
Fish and Wildlife Service regulations
implementing section lO(a). contemplate
permits "of 30 or more years duration" but
recognize that provision must be made for
changing circumstances. 48 Fed. Reg.31417,
31418 (July 8, 1983).

(i) the impact that will likely resull from such
taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to
minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the
funding that will be available to implement
such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking
the applicant considered and the reasons why
such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary
may require as being necessary or appropriate
for purposes of the plan.
Once USFWS or NMFS receives a
"conservation plan," an "opportunity for public
comment, with respect to the permit
application and the related conservation plan"
must be provided.
After reviewing the plan and
considering public comment, the agency
"shall" issue a permit if it finds:

To illustrate how a long-term conservation
plan should work, the House conference
committee singled
out the. habitat
conservation plan then being prepared to
protect the habitat of three species, including
the endangered Mission Blue Butterfly on
San Bruno Mountain in San Mateo County,
California. The committee report stated thnt
"the San Bruno Mountain plan is the model
for tbis long-term permit~ and that "the
adequacy of similar conservation plans should

(i) the taking will be incidental
(ii) the applicant will, to th~ maximum extent
practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts
of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will assure that adequate
funding for the plan will be provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild;
(v) the measures, .if any, .required under.
5

Coachella Valley Fringe-Toed Lizard protects
only 11% to 25% of its remaining habitat.
The proposed Stephens Kangaroo Rat
conservation plan, in Riverside County,
California, would permit the destruction of
20% of the remaining occupied habitat of the
species (about 4,000 acres) while protecting
about the same amount.
The recently
: approved Delano, California conservation plan
· allows the permanent destruction of 287 acres
'.of habitat for three endangered species in
· return for the acquisition and fencing of 514
acres of habitat elsewhere. No other phm
currently in place will achieve nearly the level
of comprehensive protection required by the
San Bruno plan.

be measured against the San Bruno plan."
Unlike 7(b)(4)n(o)(2) "statement",
section lO(a) taking "permits" have only been
issued in a handful of cases: Delano,
California Habitat Conservation Plan (permit
issued January 1990); The Coachella Valley,
California Habitat Conservation PUm for the
Coachella Valley Fringe-Toed Lizard (permit
issued 1986); The San Bruno Mountain,
California Habitat Conservation Plan (permit
issued 1983). However, as many as thirty
more conservation plans are currently on the
(~.
The Balcones
drawing board
Canyonlands (Austin, Texas Regional) Habitat
Conservation Plan; The Riverside County,
California Stephens Kangaroo Rat Habitat
Conservation Plan.

Individuals involved with endangered
species issues have reservations about the
ability of the section lO(a) process to protect
endangered species.
Dr. Craig Pease:
involved in the biological assessment for the
Balcones Canyonlands (Austin Regional)
Habitat Conservation Plan, notes that the
compromise process required for the
development of lO(a) conservation plans
quickly precludes bold solutions to habitat
conservation problems. Telephone interview,
Craig Pease (February 2, 1990). John W.
Thompson, a member of the Society of
American Foresters, concerned with
Red-Cockaded
Woodpecker habitat
conservation on private lands, observes that
the lO(a) process creates ~too big a
temptation for bureaucrats who think their
job is to issue permits." Telephone interview,
John W. Thompson (February 2, 1990).
William Bunch, an attorney representing
Texas Earth First! in the Balcones
Canyonlands (Austin Regional) Habitat
Conservation Plan process believes that the
value of the lO(a) process remains to be
seen. Telephone interview, William Bunch
(March 1, 1990).

A lO(a) permit has been challenged
only once in court and that court test may
have little relevance for future challenges to
conservation plans because it was ·a challenge
to the same San Bruno plan that Congress
had praised in drafting the section lO(a)
legislation, the plan against which all other
plans were to be measured. Friends of
Endangered Species v. Jantzen 596 F. Supp.
518 (N.D. Cal. 1984) afrd 760 F.2d 976 (9th
Cir. 1985) (upholding the San Bruno Plan
because: (1) Congress had considered the San
Bruno plan as a "paradigm" for section lO(a)
conservation plans; (2) USFWS had
determined that the plan would enhance the
habitat of the Mission Blue Butterfly; (3)
USFWS had considered expert opinion and
public comment before issuing the incidental
take permit; and (4) the taking permit was
subject to revocation or reconsideration if
significant new information emerged).
The San Bruno Plan permanently
protected 86% of the Mission Blue Butterfly
habitat and provided for habitat enhancement.
Unfortunately, it is exceptional.
The
conservation plan desi~ned to prot':!ct the

USFWS
officials charged with
implementing the process are also concerned,.
6

but more often about the lack of any
provision for interim taking permits while
long range conservation plans are being
prepared.
Telephone interview, James
Bartell, USFWS Sacramento, (March 14,
1990); Telephone interview, Joseph Johnston,
USFWS, Fort Worth, (March 12, 1990);
Telephone interview Peter Stine, USFWS,
Ventura, (February 15, 1990).

D. Conclusion: Exceptions and Enforcement
of the Taking Prohibition
Recent developments demonstrate that it
is too early to draw any general conclusions
about the effect of either the 7(b)(4)n(o )(2)
or lO(a) exceptions to the section 9 taking
prohibition. However, regardless of their .
intrinsic value, their existence radically alters
the policy considerations for enforcing the
section 9 taking prohibition. Before 1982,
the taking prohibition was, for the most part,
unconditional. If an action were going to kill
or injure a member of an endangered species,
that action was illegal. In contrast, after
1982, any enti~, public or private, federal or
non-federal, can seek to shield almost any
contemplated action from the taking
prohibition, so long as the action will not
threaten the existence of an endangered
species as a whole.

As the 1988 Endangered Species
Act Report of the United States General
Accounting Office noted concerning the San
Bruno Plan:
While FWS officials we spoke to generally
view the 1982 amendments as a valuable tool
to allow development while rece1vmg
concessions nod funding from developers to
protect the species, a local [San Francisco)
conservation group views the amendments as
'a dangerous loophole to the original intent
of the Endangered Species Act ...

The existence of the 1982 exceptions .to
the taking prohibition supports three
arguments in favor of full enforcement of the
the
section 9 taking prohibition.
First,
exceptions make enforcement more palatable
because they give potential violators an
opportunity to shield themselves from liability.
If a public or private entity ignores the
exception process, created for its benefit by
the 1982 amendments, and goes ahead with
an action that may kill or injure members of
an endangered species, then it has brought
section 9 liability upon itself and is in no
position to complain if it is enjoined, fined or
jailed. In other words, full enforcement of
the taking prohibition is fair.

United States General Accounting Office,
Endangered
Species:
Management
Improvements Could Enhance Recovery
Program, 43 (December 1988).
On the bright side, the 10(a)
process lias prompted some of the creativity
and "ecosystem thinkint it was intended to
encourage. The currently proposed Balcones
CanyonJands (Austin Regional) Habitat
Conservation Plan is being designed to
protect the habitat of the officially
endangered Black-Capped Verio, the as yet
unlisted Golden-cheeked Warbler, two rare
but unlisted plants and an entire biota of
cave invertebrates, some of which are listed
as endangered but many of which have, not
yet even been formally identified. The
Balcones Canyonlands Plan demonstrates the
possible promise of using the 10(a) permit
process
to
fashion
ecosystem-based
endangered species protection.

Second, enforcement of the taking
prohibition works to force those whose
actions may harm endangered species to
engage in the administrative process cr~ated
by the exceptions -- a process in which
federal agency expertise potentially can limit
the danger to endangered species and resolve
conflicts between endangered species and ·
7

contemplated actions. This is far preferable,
for everyone, to the high stakes game of
"chicken" that results when an entity
undertakes an action that is potenti11lly
harmful to an endangered species because it
gambles that no one else has the information,
resources, or desire to sue to stop that action.
In other words, full enforcement will force
potential violators to use the exception
processes.

to protect. endangered species and their
ecosystems. The prohjbition functions best in
that role if fully enforced.

Third, the key to preserving
endangered species is preserving the
ecosystems on which they depend. Congress
intended that the exceptions to the taking
prohibition should encourage creative
solutions to endangered species preservation
problems, solutions that, among other things,
consider the welfare of the ecosystem as a
whole. Obviously, these creative solutions
cannot
be
formulated,
much
less
implemented, unless the section 9 taking
prohibition provides a credible threat to
potential violators: A threat that failure to
put up the time, energy and money involved
in formulating and implementing creative
solutions, will result in much greater
expenditures of time, energy and money
fighting a section 9 taking suit.
The
encouraging Balcones Canyonlands (Austin
Regional) Habitat Conservation plan is. in
part, the result of letters of intent to sue
under section 9 filed by Texas Earth First!
In other words, enforcement \viii make the
exception processes work for the benefit of
species and their ecosystems.
Much of the past reluctance to
enforce th'e section 9 prohibition appears to
have grown out of perceptions that the
prohibition was inflexible, perceptions formed
before the 1982 amendments created the two
Those amendments
exception processes.
changed the section 9 prohibition from an
unconditional prohjbition into a tool for
forcing reluctant public and. private entities to
engage in the administrative process designed
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